







The Dynamics of Earnings in Germany: 






























The Dynamics of Earnings in Germany: 
Evidence from Social Security Records 
  Timm Bönke 
(timm.boenke@fu-berlin.de) 








 Freie Universität Berlin and DIW Berlin 
 
August 2015  
 
Abstract: This paper uncovers ongoing trends in idiosyncratic earnings volatility across generations by 
decomposing residual earnings auto-covariances into a permanent and a transitory component. We 
employ data on complete earnings life cycles for prime age men born 1935 through 1974 that covers 
earnings between 1960 and 2009. Over this period, the German labor market undergoes a heavy 
transformation and experiences strong deregulation, deunionization and a shift in employment from 
the industrial to the service sector. Our findings of increases in both components reflect the distinct 
phases of this transformation process. In magnitude, the transitory component increases most 
strongly in the early 1970s and the 1990s for young workers, whereas the permanent component 
displays the strongest increases for older workers in the early 1980 and the 2000s. Thus, the changes 
complicate the labor market entry for young workers while widening wage differences for established 
workers. 
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Labor markets and their earnings structure are continuously subject to profound changes. Examples 
are globalization, skill biased technological change, demographic trends, booms and recessions ─ 
frequently followed by adjustments of (labor market related) institutions. All of these are discussed 
extensively in the literature, impacting labor market earnings and their volatility over the life cycle, 
altering idiosyncratic earnings risks and earnings levels associated with labor market experience, age, 
cohort or skill set. In an economic environment characterized by incomplete insurance, a thorough 
analysis of these earnings dynamics and earnings risks over the life cycle is linked not only to individual 
financial decisions like wealth accumulation (Hugget, 1996; Castaneda et al., 2003), but also to 
lifetime earnings inequality (Bönke et al., 2015) and consumption capabilities (Gourinchas and Parker, 
2002; Guvenen, 2007). It is also connected to the welfare costs related to earnings fluctuations 
(Storesletten et al., 2001; Blundell and Preston, 2008), and how insurance through welfare states is 
able to enhance overall welfare by mitigating these earnings risks efficiently (e.g. Blundell et al., 2014). 
For these issues, a deep understanding of the (changing) nature of labor market outcomes and of the 
persistence and variance of labor market shocks is needed.  
This paper sheds light on the age related patterns of idiosyncratic earnings volatility over complete 
life cycles for West German males born between 1935 and 1974 from 1960 through 2009. Considering 
consistency and comparability, we focus on the main employment phase between 25 and 59. The 
long time frame offers unique possibilities to analyze the effects of varying economic circumstances 
on cohorts’ earnings dynamics. Our oldest cohorts enter the labor market in the 1960s during the 
German “Wirtschaftswunder”-era, which was characterized by low unemployment, high job security 
and a compressed wage distribution. By the mid-1970s, these favorable economic circumstances 
began to fade when Germany experienced several severe recessions and rising mass unemployment 
since in the early 1980s. After German unification, the situation further deteriorated. The weak 
economic performance coincided with rising fiscal imbalances fueled by the financial burden of 
economic integration of former socialist East Germany. The labor market was pressured by growing 
competition with Eastern Europe and mass immigration.1 The challenges cumulated and by the mid-
1990s, low growth rates and peaking unemployment made Germany the sick man of Europe (e. g. 
Economist, 2004). Then, legislators reacted by deregulating the labor market to increase flexibility. 
Regulatory changes were accompanied by a weakening of the traditional German labor market: trade 
unions, collective sectoral agreements, and the industrial sector as an employer all declined in 
                                                          
1 Almost five million immigrants from East Germany and ethnic Germans from the Eastern Bloc entered the 
West German labor market in the 1990s (Bauer et al., 2005). 
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importance. Thus, younger cohorts experience a labor market environment that differs dramatically 
from that of earlier generations. 
The aim of this study is to identifying long- and short-term effects of (changing) labor market 
regulations and institutions on earnings dynamics. Therefore, we extend the model of Baker and 
Solon (2003) to fit data over long periods. We distinguish between long-term and short-term shocks 
by decomposing the auto-covariances of residual earnings into a permanent and a transitory 
component. For this purpose, we explicitly model the two sources of variation in earnings data 
(MaCurdy, 2007; Bowlus and Robin, 2012): Macroeconomic dynamics relating to business cycle 
fluctuations, institutional changes or growth that cause changes to cross-sectional distributions over 
time, as well as microeconomic dynamics that define the changes of individuals’ relative positions 
within cross-sectional distributions of successive periods. Microeconomic dynamics are modeled as 
follows: The permanent component considers permanent shocks to, as well as differences in, 
individual earnings trajectories by the inclusion of both a random walk and random growth. This 
captures differences in earnings levels and growth patterns due to education, effort, tenure, as well 
as permanent up- or downward shifts of earnings paths due to, e.g., health shocks. The transitory 
component is modeled as an AR(1) process with additional flexibility through a quartic age term that 
allows diverging shock levels by age. To correctly identify these life cycle parameters, macroeconomic 
dynamics are explicitly modeled as calendar time shifters for both permanent and transitory 
component. For an accurate identification of generational differences, the model also includes cohort 
shifters for both components.  
As a general pattern across life cycles, we find that the permanent component steadily increases as 
the individual ages, where the transitory component is almost u-shaped over the life cycle. In the 
early stages, the predominant share of earnings volatility is explained by short-term fluctuations, 
which typically vanish after about two years. Long-term divergences then become more relevant, 
surpassing the transitory component in its relative importance around age 35. This mirrors the 
structure of earnings trajectories, which are typically settled after age 35 in Germany (e.g. Bönke et 
al., 2015), and implies that shocks endured thereafter are more likely to be permanent. At the end of 
the life cycle, the transitory component again increases in relevance. Thus, earnings shocks in close 
distance to retirement are not likely to be permanent but rather reflect an opting out of the labor 
market.  
Comparing earnings dynamics from 1960 to 2009, our results indeed suggest a rising overall variance 
through an increase in both permanent and transitory component. For the transitory component, we 
identify that the increase started in the mid-1970s and intensified in the mid-1990s. The increase is 
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especially pronounced for younger workers. Thus, establishing themselves on the labor market 
became increasingly more demanding for labor market entrants because earnings paths were 
interrupted more often. For the permanent component, we find strong increases since the 1980s that 
amplify in the early 2000s. In terms of magnitude, the permanent component increases more strongly 
for workers well established in their careers. Hence, persistent differences, such as education, entail 
a lower earnings path for low skilled workers and a higher one for highly skilled workers (Blundell et 
al., 2014). Further, the increasing importance of permanent shocks indicates that it becomes more 
difficult for individuals to reestablish themselves on the labor market after large shocks like health 
shocks or involuntary job loss both over the life cycle and across generations. The findings relate well 
to the overall developments on the German labor market. 
Our paper relates in particular to three strands of the earnings literature: the long term trend of 
earnings dynamics in Germany, the decomposition of earnings variances into inequality and instability 
and the evolution of earnings dynamics over complete life cycles. First, regarding the evolution of 
earnings dynamics in Germany, our findings complement the studies on earnings and wage inequality 
over time and life cycles, which document an increase of cross-sectional and lifetime earnings 
inequality in Germany. Reasons are, e. g., overall wage dispersion, increasing plant level 
heterogeneity (Card et al., 2013), changes in workforce composition, deunionization, deregulation, 
and job polarization (Dustmann et al., 2009). Bönke et al. (2015) identify a steep decrease of 
employment spells as one of the main reasons for the rising inequality between generations. Our 
findings are consistent with these explanations, as they imply more divergent earnings paths and 
decreasing job stability. We complement this literature by uncovering what part of inequality is 
transitory and what part is permanent at various points of the life cycle and how these patterns evolve 
across generations. Therefore, we contribute to a deeper understanding of how current and past 
inequality trends are composed, which also identifying ongoing trends. 
Second, our study relates to papers applying a variance decomposition approach to document the 
development of earnings inequality and instability in a specific country over time, e.g. Shin and Solon 
(2011) and Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994; 2002; 2012) for the United States, Baker and Solon (2003) 
for Canada or Cappellari (2004) for Italy.2 Similar to our results, the vast majority finds increasing 
earnings volatility over time, which is to a larger extent driven by the permanent component. This 
paper fills a gap by providing comprehensive results for Germany. In addition, our data enable us for 
                                                          
2 Further, there are, inter alia, studies on Great Britain by Dickens (2000), Luxembourg by Sologon and Van Kerm 
(2014), Sweden by Gustavsson (2008) or Denmark (Bingley et al., 2013). Oftentimes, subgroup developments 
are compared (e. g. blue vs. white collar workers, education groups, immigrants vs. natives). 
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the first time to follow several birth cohorts over their complete earnings paths from labor market 
entry to exit. This allows us to show how to fit variance decompositions over extensive time periods.3 
Since we can confirm many of the results found in the literature, our study validates this 
decomposition approach on earnings dynamics for the shorter periods and incomplete biographies 
used by previous studies.  
Finally, we look at complete life cycles. Therefore, this paper relates to studies that contribute to the 
microeconomic dynamics of life cycle earnings risk4 with the purpose of providing evidence for an 
improved calibration of macroeconomic models, stressing the importance of heterogeneous age-
specific innovations (e.g. Guvenen, 2009; Karahan and Ozkan, 2013). While the parameters of our 
model can be also used for calibration exercises, our results foremost emphasize the inclusion of 
cohort differences. Microeconomic dynamics of the life cycle are also analyzed with regard to 
education (Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004), family context (Blundell et al., 2014; Bingley et al., 2014), and 
shocks of higher moments across the distribution (Guvenen et al. 2014; Guvenen et al., 2015). These 
studies show that education, family context and higher moments significantly influence idiosyncratic 
earnings risk. We contribute by modeling complete life-cycles with the inclusion of macroeconomic 
dynamics and generational differences. While still identifying common microeconomic dynamics, we 
show that permanent and transitory shocks vary substantially across generations.  
The remainder of this study is structured as follows: Section 2 describes key facts on the evolution of 
the German labor market. Section 3 provides the theoretical model on earnings dynamic, while 
Section 4 presents the underlying dataset, related issues and sample descriptives. Section 5 covers the 
main estimation results, discusses the implications and relates the findings to the developments on 
the German labor market. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Macroeconomic trends and institutional changes in Germany since 1950 
For classification and interpretation of empirical long run trends, this section gives a brief, concise 
history of major changes affecting the West German labor market since 1950- supported by key 
indicators in Figures 1 and 2. In addition to standard indicators for overall economic performance, 
such as annual GDP growth and unemployment, Figure 1 provides an indicator for openness and the 
shares of employees by sector. We define openness as the combined share of imports and exports 
                                                          
3 None of the underlying datasets used in other studies include enough data to cover complete life cycles. 
Additionally, most studies focus on shorter 15 to 25 year periods. 
4 These papers disregard macroeconomic dynamics and abstract from cohort and calendar time effects. 
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over GDP.5 Openness relates to international connectedness. Increasing connectedness likely 
threatens wages of low-skilled workers and potentially increases inequality (e. g. Krugman and 
Venables, 1995; Wood, 1995). The shares of employees reveal which of the three sectors employs the 
most: industry, services or agriculture. Each sector entails distinct properties regarding e.g. 
remuneration rules or type of employment contracts. Therefore, shifts in sectoral importance relate 
to shifts in the overall labor market environment and translate into changes in wage dispersion and 
job security. Figure 2 complements the indicators by providing the ratio of union members and 
employees to the percentage of employees covered by sectoral contracting agreements. Sectoral 
contracting implies that contracts for these employees are negotiated between employer associations 
and trade unions on national or federal state level. Both indicators describe union power, which in 
turn relates to wage compression and inequality (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2001). Figure 2 also covers 
indicators of labor market deregulation and shows the shares of subcontracted employees and of 
those with fixed term contracts.6 
The developments on the West German labor market following World War II can be divided into three 
distinct phases. The first phase is called the German Wirtschaftswunder, which lasted from the late 
1940s, after World War II, through the early 1970s. After regaining some political independence from 
Allied Powers, the West German economy transformed rapidly and began producing consumer goods 
and equipment. Labor demand increased immensely through a combination of ongoing 
reconstruction of war damages, increasing consumer demand, as well as the relocation of firms and 
manufacturing bases from East Germany to the West.7 Until around 1950, large inflows of about 8 
million displaced German workers from the former eastern territories of the German Reich satisfied 
this demand (Bauer et al., 2013). Labor demand was then met by the westward migration of East 
Germans (until 1961) and the recruitment of guest workers (late 1950s to early 1970s).8 Naturally, the 
strong labor demand and high GDP growth rates coincided with extremely low unemployment rates 
                                                          
5 Other measures of openness like foreign direct investment show similar trends.  
6 In addition to the deregulation trends reported in the lower panel of Figure 2, Table C.1 provides an overview 
on the chronology of laws regarding labor market (de)regulation since 1972.  
7  For example, Buenstorf and Guenther (2010) find that 23% of the East German machine tools industry 
reallocated to West Germany shortly after World War II. 
8 Until 1950, the labor force grew mainly due to forced migration of Germans from Eastern Europe following the 
conclusion of World War II. The bulk of the displaced originated from the former eastern territories of the 
German Reich (Pomerania, Prussia, Silesia). The inflow of migrants from the German Democratic Republic 
numbers about 2.6 million and stopped with the closing of the inner German border, best symbolized with the 
Berlin Wall in 1961 (Bauer et al., 2005). In the late 1950s, the West German government started a large scale 
recruitment of guest workers due to a shortage in low-skilled labor (Bauer et al., 2005). This active manpower 
recruitment included treaties with several countries, most notably Italy (1955), Spain and Greece (1961), Turkey 




(Figure 1). More than half of the employees worked in the industrial sector, characterized by strong 
unions, high job security and a rather compressed wage distribution due to sectoral agreements 
(Figures 1 and 2). Figure 2 also reveals that there was one union member for every three employees9 
and that sectoral contracting covered more than four-fifths of all employees. During this period, 
legislators expanded the welfare state and enhanced labor contract protection (Bartels, 2014). In sum, 
the Wirtschaftswunder-era characterized a growing, industry dominated society with strong unions 
and high labor market protection. 
Between the mid-1970s and German reunification in 1990, this successful system started to dissolve. 
Global developments gained influence and increasingly affected the interconnected German economy 
(Figure 1), while competitiveness became a growing issue. The first oil price shock in 1973 caused a 
recession with unemployment rates tripling, reaching 5%. The share of employment in the 
manufacturing sector started declining steadily while that of the service sector grew continuously; 
employment trends that continue to this day (Figure 1).10 While unions remained strong, legislators 
slightly deregulated the labor market and introduced subcontracted work in 1972 to increase flexibility 
(Table C.1 and Figure 2).11 After the second oil price shock in 1979/80, another recession hit Germany, 
causing unemployment of more than 9% (Figure 1). Legislators considered labor market rigidity to be 
a key problem and in response they lowered employment protection, expanded possibilities for 
subcontracted work, and introduced fixed term contracts (Table C.1). At the same time, the ratio of 
union members to employees declined, while sectoral coverage remained about constant (Figure 2).  
After a short lived boom following reunification in the early 1990s, a subsequent recession marked 
another turning point for the German labor market. Already experiencing mass unemployment, 
growing competition from the former socialist European countries put additional pressure, especially 
for low skilled individuals. Further, the West German labor market was the target of migration for 
about 5 million people between 1989 and 1995, amplifying this pressure.12 Influx and availability of 
new labor directly affected unemployment, reaching 10.8% in 1997. Further, due to the very low 
degree of unionization of East German workers, overall union membership dwindled more rapidly 
than before, falling below 25% in 1997 (Figure 2). At the same time, in 1997 sectorial contracting 
                                                          
9 The large migration inflow reduced the ratio of union members to employees until 1960, but this does not 
qualify as a trend. 
10 For example, the number of West German firms in textile industry dropped from 14,400 in 1960 to 4,000 in 
2000, a trend common in industrialized countries (Bartels, 2014). 
11 For an overview of key laws regarding labor market regulation see Table C.1. 
12 The majority of the immigrants to West Germany originated from former socialist Eastern Germany. 
However, starting with the fall of the Irion Curtain in 1989 until 1995, each year several hundred thousand 
native German immigrants (Spätaussiedler) and foreign workers from former socialist Eastern European 
territories immigrated to Germany (Bauer et al., 2005). Bauer et al. (2005) further report that asylum-seekers 
and refugees led to the historical peak of 782,000 net immigrants in 1992.  
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covered only about two-thirds of employees. Especially after 1996, newly established plants are no 
longer part of the classical sectoral contracting system (Card et al., 2013). The manufacturing sector 
employed less than one-third of the work force, with the remainder finding employment in the service 
sector (Figure 1). The decline in both union coverage and the industrial employment reflected 
continuing trends that started in the 1970s. At the same time, the fiscal imbalance grew: in particular 
social expenditures steadily rose due to costs related to unifying Germany’s labor market and social 
security system (Bartels, 2014). By the mid-1990s, a high public deficit, low growths rates and peaking 
unemployment made Germany the sick man of Europe (e. g. Economist, 2004). Again, legislators saw 
labor market rigidity and high per unit labor costs as the key labor market problem and strongly 
expanded the possibilities of fixed term and subcontracted work (see Table C.1.). In what followed, 
economic openness strongly increased as Germany became a more integrated economy. Germany 
eventually recovered from being the sick man of Europe, but its labor market radically changed in the 
process- with effects on the evolution of earnings dynamics.  
 
 
Figure 1: Macroeconomic development in Germany: GDP, unemployment, openness and sectoral 
employment 
 
Note: Panels (a), (c) and (d) display West Germany before 1990 and reunited Germany thereafter. Panel (b) shows West 
Germany only, as East German unemployment rates are substantially higher. 
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Figure 2: Union membership, sectoral coverage and shares of fixed term and subcontracted workers
Note: Panels (a), (c) and (d) display West Germany before 1990 and reunited Germany thereafter. Panel (b) displays results 
for West Germany only. 
Source: Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (2015): Panel (a): Armingeon et al. (2014): Panel (b) until 1990; Kohaut and 
Schnabel (2002), Ellgut and Kohaut (2005, 2008, 2013): Panel (b) since 1995; Federal Statistical Office (2015): Panels (c) and 
(d) 
 
3 Model and estimation 
Our aim is to model earnings dynamics over entire life cycles, while explicitly modeling micro- and 
macroeconomic dynamics. Further, we distinguish between permanent (or long-term) and transitory 
(or short-term) earnings path deviations. Comparable models date back to Lillard and Weiss (1979) 
and Hause (1980). Our model is essentially an extension of the model developed by Baker and Solon 
(2003).13 To model the microeconomic dynamics of the permanent income component over the life 
cycle and to mirror the most important, well documented, features of labor markets, we rely on two 
processes, a random growth and a random walk. The random growth process relates to a Mincerian 
approach and captures earnings growth due to labor market experience or on the job training/tenure. 
This allows individuals to have permanently higher or lower growth paths than other individuals (or 
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the cohort average). Different paths are caused by e. g. different levels of innate abilities, effort levels 
or education. The random walk captures permanent shifts from the individual earnings path. It models 
a random permanent shock that does not fade over time and can be caused by e. g. job displacements, 
negative health shocks, or additional qualifications achieved after entering the labor market.14 
Transitory shocks on the other hand describe temporary deviations from individual permanent 
earnings paths that fade as the individual ages. The shock persistence is modeled by assuming an AR(1) 
process. We now build the model step by step. 
Decomposing individual 𝑖𝑖 log earnings into period 𝑡𝑡 and cohort 𝑐𝑐 specific mean earnings 𝑦𝑦�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 and the 
deviations from it, we get:  
(1) 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝑦𝑦�𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐,  
where  𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  is the individual deviation from the cohort mean. In the present case, individuals range 
from 𝑖𝑖 = 1, …𝑁𝑁, periods and cohorts covered are 𝑡𝑡 = 1960, … , 2009 and 𝑐𝑐 = 1935, … ,1974. An 
important feature of modelling individual deviations from cohort and period specific mean earnings is 
its equivalency to including cohort specific age dummies. This is crucial as we investigate individual 
life cycles of up to 35 years (from age 25 to 59) and cover a 50 year period (from 1960 to 2009). 
Therefore, individual profiles are likely to be subject to cohort and age specific wage growth. By 
subtracting the mean (de-meaning), this growth is controlled for.15 The individual specific deviation is 
now assumed to be additively decomposable into a permanent (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑃𝑃 ) and a transitory component 
(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑇𝑇 ): 
(2) 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 + 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇   
Further, we define 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑃𝑃 � = 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇 � = 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃 �𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑇𝑇 � = 0. Thus, expected values of both 
components are zero and orthogonal. Considering the aforementioned specification of the permanent 
earnings as a combination of a random walk and a random growth, the assumed process has the 
following form: 
(3) 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑃𝑃 = 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐[𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐 − 25) + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐]  
                                                          
14 This captures the idea that an additional degree obtained parallel to working from e.g. evening classes or 
weekend seminars permanently shifts the individual earnings path. 
15 This idea is introduced by Baker and Solon (2003) and is used by e. g. Bingley et al. (2013). Alternatives are 
regression approaches that include individual characteristics (e.g. Gottschalk and Moffitt, 2012; Meghir and 
Pistaferri, 2004). Since our dataset lacks most of the commonly used socio-economic characteristics, de-meaning 
seems the superior strategy. Further, Bingley et al. (2013) find that de-meaning gives similar results to first-stage 
regressions that include information on industry, education or local unemployment. 
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The random growth process is represented by 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐 − 25). Starting at age 25, the initial earnings 
of an individual 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖  are allowed to grow with the individual specific growth rate 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖  over time. This 
specification ensures that earnings levels vary both in absolute terms and by the individual’s ability to 
accumulate skills or exert effort over the life cycle.16 Initial earnings as well as the growth rate are 
assumed to stem from zero mean distributions; 
 (𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 , 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖)~�(0,0); �𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇 ,𝜎𝜎𝛾𝛾,𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇𝛾𝛾 ��,  
where 𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇 captures the variance of the starting level and 𝜎𝜎𝛾𝛾 the variance of the subsequent earnings 
growth. Then, 𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇𝛾𝛾 denotes the covariance between the two components. A positive 𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇𝛾𝛾 means that 
those with initially high earnings also experience higher subsequent earnings growth. If the covariance 
is negative, this suggests the existence of Mincerian cross-overs (e. g. Mincer 1974; Lillard and Weiss 
1979; Hause, 1980; Baker and Solon, 2003; Bingley et al., 2013). Then, individuals with initially high 
earnings upon entering the labor market experience lower subsequent earnings growth. If so, within 
cohort earnings inequality will decrease in the beginning and then increase at later stages of the life 
cycle.  
The (independent) variance of permanent re-orderings is captured by 𝜎𝜎𝑟𝑟 , which allows a linear ‘white 
noise’ innovation in the permanent component (Baker and Solon, 2003). The random walk component 
𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐  is defined as: 
(4) 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐(𝑐𝑐−1) + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐.  
As mentioned above, the permanent component includes shocks with permanent effects like job 
changes, job displacements or disabling injuries (e.g. MaCurdy 1982; Moffitt and Gottschalk, 1995; 
2012; Baker and Solon, 2003). The random walk component is assumed to be i.i.d. with 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐~(0;𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢). 
The random growth and random walk processes represent the core of our permanent earnings 
specification and account for individual heterogeneity.  In addition, we allow permanent earnings to 
vary by cohort and time through a set of factor loadings over years, 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐, and cohorts, 𝜅𝜅𝑐𝑐. These factor 
loadings ensure correct identification of the microeconomic dynamics in core model parameters 
because they allow macroeconomic dynamics, e.g. institutional changes like the introduction of 
temporary employment, to affect cohorts in a different way. Assuming independence between growth 
parameters, time of labor market participation and random permanent shocks, the auto-covariance 
structure of permanent earnings for period 𝑡𝑡 and period 𝑒𝑒 can be written as: 
(5) 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑃𝑃 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖
𝑃𝑃 � = 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝜅𝜅𝑐𝑐2�𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇2 + 𝜎𝜎𝛾𝛾2𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 + 𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇𝛾𝛾(𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒) + 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2𝑒𝑒�  
                                                          
16 See e.g. Baker (1997), Baker and Solon (2003), Cappellari (2004), Bingley et al. (2013). 
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In an exemplary case for cohort 𝑐𝑐 = 1935 in period 𝑡𝑡 = 1970 the variance (hence for 𝑡𝑡 = 𝑒𝑒) of the 
permanent component according to (5) is displayed in equation (5a). Note that the process builds on 
earnings of individuals who are at least 25 years of age. Therefore, cohort 1935 entered in 1960 and 
is 10 years past its entry in 1970:  
(5a) 𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,1935,1970𝑃𝑃 � = 𝜋𝜋19702 𝜅𝜅19352 �𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇2 + 100𝜎𝜎𝛾𝛾2 + 20𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇𝛾𝛾 + 10𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2�  
For the microeconomic dynamics of the transitory component, several studies establish that a low 
order ARMA-process is sufficient.17  Specifically, we follow e. g. Baker and Solon (2003) and model an 
AR(1) process for the transitory earnings component. Similarly, we adopt period (𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐) and cohort (𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐) 
specific shifters to explicitly model the influence of institutional changes or macroeconomic trends on 
specific cohorts and to correctly identify the microeconomic dynamics of earnings insecurity. For the 
transitory component we obtain: 
(6) 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑇𝑇 = 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 = 𝜌𝜌𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐−1 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐   
where 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐 is a random shock with  𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐~(0;𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖) and 0 < 𝜌𝜌 < 1 the persistence of the transitory shock. 
The initial transitory variation at the first period of observation, 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖0~(0;𝜎𝜎02),  is observed at 𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐 −25 =  0 (thus at age 25). Subsequent earnings instability is captured by the variance of 
innovations 𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖2. Typically, earnings or wage instability is associated with a u-shaped pattern in age with 
higher instability for young (labor market entry) and old (labor market exit) workers. To allow earnings 
instability to vary with age, we follow Baker and Solon (2003) and incorporate a quartic age function 
(polynomial of the fourth degree) of the variance 𝜎𝜎ϵ.18 In sum, the auto-covariance structure of 
transitory earnings can be written as:  
(7) 𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑇𝑇 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑇𝑇 � = 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐2�𝜌𝜌2𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐−1�+ 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐2�𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,02 + (𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐)𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,12 + (𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐)2𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,22 + (𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐)3𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,32+ (𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐)4𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,42 ��   
And for 𝑡𝑡 ≠ 𝑒𝑒 we obtain: 
                                                          
17 E. g. Moffitt and Gottschalk (2012) find that higher order ARMA-parameters are not significant. 
18 However, we deviate from Baker and Solon (2003) not only in the incorporation of permanent cohort shifters, 
but also in the incorporation of a transitory cohort shifter, 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐  , in addition to the usual transitory period shifter, 
𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐. Further, Baker and Solon (2003) model cohort specific initial variances. However, more recent literature 
shows that those are subject to a potential bias due to left-censoring (e.g. Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2012). Since 
we observe cohorts from the beginning (here, age 25), this bias does not apply to our setting. In order to ensure 
a comparison with other recent models and in order to be able to shorten the timeframe for a robustness test, 
we moved away from the cohort specific initial variances to cohort specific transitory shifters. The results for 
both specifications are not qualitatively different. Still, the latter specification gives a slightly better fit. 





𝑇𝑇 � = 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐2�𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐−1𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)�   
Returning to our example from (5a), the variance of the transitory component for cohort 1935 in 
period 1960 amounts to: 
(7b) 𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖1935,1970𝑇𝑇 � = 
𝜆𝜆1935
2 �𝜌𝜌2𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖1935,1969� + 𝜏𝜏19702 (𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,02 + 10𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,12 + 100𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,22 + 1,000𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,32+ 10,000𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,42 )�   
Due to the orthogonality assumption, the total auto-covariance structure results from the sum of the 
permanent component (5) and the transitory component (7) or (7a) respectively. For the estimation 
procedure, we apply equally weighted minimum distance. See Appendix B for details. 
4 Data and descriptives 
4.1 Sample selection 
We use Versicherungskontenstichprobe (VSKT), German social security data, as provided by Deutsche 
Rentenversicherung.19 A stratified random sample, the VSKT provides the records of mandatorily 
insured employees in Germany. The requirements are at least one (pension relevant) entry in the 
employment biography and 30 to 67 years of age in the reference year. We use the waves of the 
reference years 2002 and 2004-2009. The VSKT contains the employment biographies after 14 years 
of age until the age in the reference year (up to a maximum of 67 years of age). These biographies 
include monthly information on (un-)employment, sickness and pension contributions. The latter are 
used to calculate the individual earnings. In line with most of the literature on earnings component 
models using administrative data, we only consider earnings covered by social security. Earnings from 
self-employment and government transfers are not included in our wage measure.20 The VSKT 
represents about 80% of the total male work force in West Germany (Bönke et al., 2015). 
We consider men only to ensure comparability to related studies and to avoid sample selection issues 
due to changing labor market participation rates of women (Bönke et al., 2015). This also simplifies 
comparisons to other studies, which almost exclusively focus on men. Further, we focus on men 
between 25 and 59 years of age. This excludes from our analysis both the unstable years of very young 
                                                          
19 Our dataset, FDZ-RV—VSKT2002, 2004–9_Bönke, is accessible through controlled remote computing and 
provided by the Data Research Centre of Deutsche Rentenversicherung (the German statutory pension scheme).  
Cohorts and the underlying sample are constructed in the same way as in Bönke et al. (2015). 




workers (including military and civil service) and the retirement transition period. Then, we focus on 
native Germans who have always worked in West Germany to avoid the problem of fractured 
biographies.21 Individuals who have worked in East Germany are excluded because their earnings 
information and earnings level over time is not comparable to that of West Germans. This especially 
holds for the older sample cohorts. Younger East German cohorts are then excluded to ensure sample 
consistency for the investigation of long run trends.  
The oldest cohort we observe is born in 1935. For this cohort and all others up to cohort 1950, we 
observe complete life cycles from age 25 to age 59. For those born after 1950, we observe biographies 
that are right censored at the cohort’s age in 2009. We include 40 cohorts up to the one born in 1974 
to ensure a sufficiently long period of observation.22 
Although the VSKT is virtually free from measurement errors, we perform three adjustments in order 
to ensure time consistency in the earnings data. First, since one-time payments are only subject to 
social security since 1984, earnings prior to 1984 are adjusted according to their spurious growth 
between 1983 and 1984.23 Second, we deal with the problem of different levels of social security 
contributions over time and subgroups. Therefore, we add the employers’ social security contributions 
to the individual gross wages. These contributions can be seen as an approximation of the value of 
insurance that employees would have bought if the insurance had not been supplied by governmental 
institutions (Bönke et al., 2015). In this sense, the earnings we analyze represent the market value of 
labor.24 Our third adjustment is an imputation of top-coded earnings. In Germany earnings are only 
subject to social security up to a contribution ceiling. This causes our earnings data to be right-
censored at this ceiling. Our imputation method is extensively documented in Bönke et al. (2015) and 
assumes a Pareto-distribution for the upper tail. The imputation is done separately by year and cohort. 
                                                          
21 This excludes immigrants as well as native German immigrants (“Spätaussiedler”) who worked in their country 
of origin. Further, West-East migration is negligible before reunification and extremely small thereafter (Fuchs-
Schündeln and Schündeln, 2009). 
22 This subsequent entry of younger cohorts might be a problem for the identification of time and cohort effects 
of early calendar years since in these years only few cohorts are observed at the same time. Therefore we include 
a robustness test and estimate the model starting in 1979, discarding all prior years and adjusting the sample 
selection. We observe no qualitative difference in the results (see Appendix A). It seems that the auto-
covariances ensure consistent estimates even for periods when only few cohorts are present. 
23 The method is documented in Bönke et al. (2015). It is an extension of Fitzenberger’s (1999) cross sectional 
adjustment of administrative data to spurious growth. It exploits the panel structure of the VSKT and adjusts the 
wage according to the individual age and rank in the earnings distribution.  
24 Since, e. g., miners have higher levels of social security contributions and a changing relative weight over the 
cohorts, subgroup consistency can only be assured when using the market value concept. This also solves the 
problem of changing levels of social security contributions (to pension, unemployment, health, and nursing care 
insurance) over time. For instance, contributions were lower in the 1960s than in the 2000s. All parameters of 
the social security system used for constructing the market values are provided in Bönke et al. (2015). 
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Since we do not want to artificially impute variance into the sample, we follow Bönke et al. (2015) in 
the assignment of wage above the contribution ceiling and preserve the individual ranks prior to the 
censored wages. This is an assumption of minimal mobility for individuals who consistently earn wages 
above the ceiling.25  
Finally, the sample is restricted to those with consistent earnings biographies. We are left with at least 
1,000 observations per cohort and about 50,000 in total, amounting to about 1.2 million person years. 
Details are provided in Appendix A. Our results are robust to conditioning on at least 5 years of 
consecutive earnings. 26 All earnings are real earnings with the base year 2000.  
4.2 Sample descriptives 
To provide some empirical motivation to our model, this section presents important attributes of the 
evolution of earnings and their dispersion in Germany. Figure 3 displays age-earnings profiles for three 
groups sorted according to their lifetime earnings into low (1st quartile), medium (2nd and 3rd quartile) 
and high (4th quartile) earners. Lifetime earnings are calculated as real (CPI-deflated) net present 
values from ages 17 to 59. The means show the expected inverted u-shape over the life cycle, are 
closest at young ages and fan out at later ages. In line with theoretical predictions and empirical 
findings, Figure 3 reveals Mincerian cross-overs27, e. g. when the high earners’ mean passes the low 
earners’ mean at 26 and does not fall below again. 
  
                                                          
25 The opposite would be an assumption of maximal mobility, which would introduce artificial variance into the 
sample. Further, to limit the influence of outliers, we censor the highest wage at 5 times the average social 
security wage. Very few observations are affected by this censoring. Limiting the influence of outliers is common 
in the literature; see e.g. Bingley et al. (2013). Further details of the imputation method are provided by Bönke 
et al. (2015), who also validate the imputation procedure with survey data and find no difference between the 
cross-sectional earnings distributions of the VSKT and the survey data. There is no robustness-test with 
completely censored data on purpose. Since the ceiling changes by calendar year and is, in general, increasing 
over time, it must be imputed. For a thorough representation of the ceiling’s evolution see e.g. Lüthen (2015). 
26 We consider biographies to be consistent if the sample provides a nearly gapless record of individual labor 
market activities after age 30 (equal to Bönke et al., 2015). The idea of consecutive information follows Bingley 
et al. (2013), who sought a criterion that neither constructs a fully unbalanced panel nor one that excludes too 
many observations. Conditioning on consecutive earnings yields a slightly worse fit but no qualitative 
differences. The results are displayed in Appendix B. 
27 This implies that those with high earnings at young ages are not those on the highest permanent earnings 
paths (see Section 2.1 for more details). 
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Figure 3: Means of logarithmic earnings by lifetime earnings, pooled cohorts 1935-1950 
 
Source: FDZ-RV − VSKT2002, 2004-2009_Bönke, own calculations. 
Note: “Low” depicts mean earnings of individuals in the lowest quarter of lifetime earnings, “Medium” of those between the 
25th and the 75th percentile and “High” of those in the highest quarter. 
Figure 4 concentrates on developments across cohorts and shows quintile means of logarithmic 
earnings for selected ages by cohort. For ages 25 and 30, Figure 4 displays stable earnings growth as 
well as stable quintile distances across cohorts except for the lowest quintile. The lowest quintile 
fluctuates strongly and its distance to the other quintiles increases. For later ages, Figure 4 reveals 
moderate cohort specific earnings growth for quintiles 2 to 4. The highest quintile gains more and the 
lowest quintile declines across cohorts. However, distances between the lowest quintile and other 
quintiles decrease for later ages and its evolution stabilizes. This indicates more earnings instability in 
the early stages of the life cycle, which increases for younger cohorts and decreases after age 30 for 
all cohorts. Widening distances between the earnings quintiles on the other hand suggest increasing 
permanent divergences for younger cohorts and later ages. These findings are in line with Dustmann 
et al. (2014), who find decreasing wages for the 15th percentile, a rather stable median and increasing 
wages for the 85th percentile since 1990. This first impression underlines the importance of certain 
key aspects of our model: An age and cohort specific modeling of permanent and transitory 




















Figure 4: Means of logarithmic earnings for selected ages
 
Source: FDZ-RV − VSKT2002, 2004-2009_Bönke, own calculations. 
Note: Q1 to Q5 relate to the respective quintile means of logarithmic earnings at various ages. 
5 Results 
5.1 Microeconomic dynamics: Core model estimates 
Table 1 presents our core model estimates based on Equations (5) and (7). It shows that the assumed 
flexibility of the theoretical structure of the permanent and the transitory component are key to fitting 
the model to life-time earnings data. The model identifies heterogeneity both in starting levels (𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇2) 
and in subsequent earnings growth (𝜎𝜎𝛾𝛾2). The estimates suggest that individuals whose earnings grow 
one standard deviation above the mean accumulate an average income advantage of about 1.6% per 
year (100 ∙ √𝜎𝜎𝛾𝛾2  = 1.63). The result lies between the findings of Baker and Solon (2003) for Canada 
(1%) and those of Baker (1997) for the USA and Bingley et al. (2013) for Denmark (both about 2.8%). 
Since we estimate the average annual growth rate to be 0.24%, our model outcome indicates 
considerable growth rate heterogeneity.28 Like most studies on earnings dynamics (e. g. Baker and 
Solon, 2003; Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2012; Bingley et al., 2013), we estimate a negative covariance 
                                                          
28 We follow Bingley et al. (2013) and estimate the comparison estimate of average annual growth as a regression 











































Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 Q 4 Q 5
18 
 
between initial earnings and subsequent earnings growth, (𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇𝛾𝛾<0). This is typically interpreted as a 
trade-off between initially relative high earnings and subsequent earnings growth as predicted by the 
Mincer-earnings-model. Following Hause (1980) and Bingley et al. (2013), 𝑡𝑡∗ = −𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇𝛾𝛾/𝜎𝜎𝛾𝛾2 gives the 
point of lowest (permanent) inequality due to diverging earnings paths (abstracting from permanent 
shocks of the random walk). Here, we find an estimate of 1.2 years, implying a low shortly after 26 
years of age. This estimate can be related to Bönke et al. (2015), who find that earnings paths of highly 
educated individuals start below the earnings paths of the lesser educated, rise steeper, cross in the 
late 20s and exceed thereafter. 
Table 1: core model estimates 
Permanent component Transitory component 
 Coeff. SE  Coeff. SE 
𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇
2 0.05 0.02 𝜎𝜎02 0.1 0.057 
𝜎𝜎𝛾𝛾
2 0.0003 0.0001 𝜎𝜎∈,02  0.0955 0.0547 
𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢
2 0.01 0.004 𝜎𝜎∈,12  -0.018 0.01 
𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇𝛾𝛾 -0.0003 0.00017 𝜎𝜎∈,22  0.002 0.001 
    𝜎𝜎∈,32  -7.3E-05 4.2E-05 
    𝜎𝜎∈,42  1.17E-06 6.81E-07 
    𝜌𝜌 0.28 0.005 
Note: Remaining model estimates are provided in Appendix B. 
Source: FDZ-RV − VSKT2002, 2004-2009_Bönke, own calculations. 
The estimation of transitory innovations, 𝜎𝜎∈,𝑖𝑖2 , suggests a u-shape over the life cycle and is in line with 
Baker and Solon’s (2003) most comparable estimates. The innovations fall more than 60% from the 
mid-twenties to the early forties, flatten out over the forties and rise again in the early fifties and then 
reach the levels observed in the early stages of the life cycle again. Our estimate of 0.28 for 𝜌𝜌 is 
relatively low compared to other studies and suggests low shock persistence for transitory innovations 
in Germany (Baker and Solon (2003) find a value of 0.54 for Canada). The results are robust to a left-
censoring like a later start of the analysis in 1979. This robustness test shows that the low value of 𝜌𝜌 
is not driven be the higher weight of older cohorts.29 Further robustness tests include an estimation 
of the baseline model with a different sample selection criterion (5 years of consecutive employment) 
and an estimation of a model that exchanges the transitory cohort shifters for cohort-specific initial 
variances (following Baker and Solon, 2003). All robustness checks and the remaining parameters for 
period and cohort shifters of both the transitory and the permanent component are presented in 
Appendix B. 
                                                          
29 The robustness-test further reveals no qualitative difference apart from a strong increase in significance. In 
line with Gottschalk and Moffitt (2012), the robustness test includes an additional parameter to deal with left-
censoring. Details are provided in Appendix A.  
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Our findings for the underlying microeconomic dynamics indicate more earnings instability during very 
early and very late stages of the working career and increasing permanent divergences over the life 
cycle. This finding is similar even regarding country-specific aspects and differences in data quality. 
Studies that model age-dependent innovations typically find a considerable decline of earnings 
instability after age 25, reaching a trough between ages 35 – 45 and rising again thereafter (e .g. Baker 
and Solon (2003) for Canada, Karahan and Ozkan (2013) for the U.S. and Blundell et al. (2014) for 
Norway). Guvenen et al. (2015), while accounting for variation in higher order moments, conclude 
with similar results for the U.S.  
5.2 Earnings dynamics over the life cycle 
Figure 5 outlines the empirical and predicted variances over the life cycle for selected cohorts.30 The 
empirical variance evolutions (line: dash) are well matched by the predictions of the total variances ( 
line: +). The total variance decreases until the early 30s and increases afterwards. This is in line with 
studies examining inequality over the life-cycle (e. g. Björklund, 1993; Kopczuk et al., 2010; Bönke et 
al., 2015), which estimate the lowest point of overall cross-sectional inequality to be around this age. 
The evolution of the transitory component (line: ●), which is about u-shaped over the life cycle also 
after the inclusion of period and cohort shifters. The permanent component (line: Δ) usually rises over 
life cycle.  
Figure 5 also reveals two other important findings. First, younger cohorts face higher total earnings 
variance and both higher transitory and permanent variances. Second, the results suggest a different 
composition of variance components across generations. For younger cohorts we find a more 
pronounced u-shape of the transitory component and a steeper rising permanent component. Thus, 
younger cohorts face higher earnings instability at the beginning of their life cycle and a steeper rising 
permanent component, hence more divergence between earnings paths over their life cycle.  
  
                                                          
30 The interpretation given for the selected cohorts is in line with the results for all cohorts. Figures for all 
cohorts are available from the authors upon request.  
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Figure 5: Empirical and predicted variance for selected cohorts 
 
 
Source: FDZ-RV − VSKT2002, 2004-2009_Bönke, own calculations. 
 
5.3 Evolution of earnings dynamics across generations 
The structural shift in the variance components across cohorts becomes more apparent when 
comparing variances at various ages. Figure 6 displays the actual observed empirical variance (line: 
dash) and the according estimation for the permanent (line: Δ) and transitory (line: ●) component for 
each cohort at the beginning (age 25 and 30), in the midst (age 40), and toward the end (age 50) of 
the earnings career. In addition, the total estimated variance as the sum of both components is 
displayed (line: +) to give an impression of the model fit. Comparing empirical and estimated variances 
reveals a satisfying fit across all cohorts and age groups. Figure 7 complements Figure 6 and displays 
the respective growth of the permanent and transitory components at these respective ages, 
normalized by estimates for cohort 1935.  
We comment on the transitory component first. Confirming the upward shift pictured in Figure 5, 
Figure 6 and 7 reveal a marked increase at younger ages (upper panels), a considerable less 











































age pertain to the importance of the transitory component at the beginning of the working career (e. 
g. Baker and Solon, 2003). The strong trend at young ages relates to the three phases of institutional 
changes and macroeconomic trends outlined in Section 2, which particularly affect labor market 
entrants. Cohorts born until the mid-1940s entered the labor market before 1973 during favorable 
economic circumstances of the Wirtschaftswunder-period. For these cohorts, the transitory 
component remains comparably low and rather stable, mirroring low unemployment, high job 
security and no fixed term or temporary employment. Cohorts entering between the early 1970s and 
the mid-1990s encountered less favorable economic conditions and ongoing labor market 
deregulation, including the introduction of fixed term employments for first time employees (see 
Figure 4 and Table C.1.). This reflects in a tripling transitory component between pre-1946 cohorts and 
1960s cohorts at age 25 and a doubling at age 30. Finally, those born in the early 1970s experienced 
another strong increase in the transitory innovations upon labor market entry. They joined the labor 
force around and after the mid-1990s during Germany’s period as the sick man of Europe, a time of 
economic hardship characterized by mass immigration, high unemployment, sectoral shifts, 
deunionization, and competition with the former socialist East. This conjoins further labor market 
deregulation regarding dismissal protection, fixed term contracts and temporary employment (Figures 
3 and 4; Table C.1). All this contributes to the steep surge of the transitory variance observed at ages 
25 and 30 for cohorts born in 1970s. In comparison to cohorts born before the mid-1940s, 1970s 
cohorts face an earnings insecurity that is about five to seven (age 25) and three to five (age 30) times 
higher. The earnings risk still doubles for 40 year olds in course of the mid-1990s events. For 50-year-
olds, the earnings risks increases only slightly after 1995, mirroring long and stable earnings careers 
and favorable employment contracts. 
For the permanent variance, Figures 6 and 7 display an increase at all ages. The largest relative 
increase occurs for the young at age 30. Still, since the permanent component is more pronounced at 
later ages, its absolute gain is largest at ages 40 and 50 (see also Figure 5). In contrast to the transitory 
component, the increase initially starts after the second oil crises in 1980. Between 1980 and 1990, 
the permanent component doubles for ages 25 and 30; the 40 year olds are slightly less and the 50 
years olds are not affected. Thus, our results suggest that the favorable conditions of the 
Wirtschaftswunder-period only diminish after the more fierce recession following the second oil 
crises. In the 1980s, mass unemployment and deregulation put permanent pressure on the wage 
structure. In addition, the increasing number of workers in the service sector was mainly recruited 
from younger cohorts. These contracts do not offer the same security and wage compression as the 
long-term industry contracts most prominent for older cohorts. This could also explain why older, well-
established workers (aged 50) are not affected by the 1980s recession. 
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After reunification, we observe a second surge in the permanent component, coinciding with several 
severe global and local changes. While the increase at age 25 is rather small, the increase at age 30 is 
already distinct.  At ages 40 and 50, a steady rise begins around 1995 and surges in the early 2000s. 
These increases coincide with four important developments starting in the early 1990s. First, the 
ongoing globalization puts pressure on low skilled labor, e. g. through offshoring and growing 
international competition. This also reflects in the strong increases in openness since 1990 (Figure 3). 
Second, changing job requirements cause job polarization on German labor markets. Job polarization 
describes a shift in demand toward very highly skilled, non-routine labor at the expense of workers 
tasked with routine operations, e.g. due to the effect of computerization on clerical work. For 
Germany since the mid-1990s, Dustman et al. (2009) find job polarization a driving force for wage 
inequality. Third, deunionization and the opting out of sectoral agreements have also had long term 
consequences (e. g. Acemoglu et al., 2001).31 Antonczyk et al. (2010) attribute a considerable share of 
rising wage inequality to de-unionization and the decline in collective wage bargaining coverage, 
especially at the lower end of the wage distribution. Card et al. (2013) find that this joint decline of 
traditional German wage bargaining institutions increases employer-specific compensations and 
widens wage differences among employees in the same industry. Since the 1990s, wage negotiations 
have shifted from collective bargaining to the individual level. In particular establishments founded 
after 1996 are more likely to pay lower wages, to exhibit larger wage heterogeneity and to not 
participate in the sectoral contracting system. Since younger workers are more likely to work at these 
establishments, our result of rising permanent dispersion and earnings instability for younger cohorts 
are in line with a declining coverage by collective sectoral wage bargaining. Forth, the probability of 
job changes increased since the 1990s. Voluntary turnover grew since the pecuniary gains of job 
changes increase, which provides an incentive to change employers more often (Card et al., 2013). 
Involuntary job changes increased due to lowered dismissal protection and the enhancement of fixed 
term contracts and subcontracted work (Figure 4; Table C.1; Figure C.1). The rising permanent variance 
since the 1990s therefore reflects more diverse permanent earnings paths as well as larger shifts of 
the paths. The increasing importance of permanent shocks also implies greater difficulty in returning 
to the previous path after a negative shock like a health shock or involuntary job loss.  
To sum up, for evolution of the permanent component from 1960 to 2009, we identify a doubling at 
age 25, a fivefold increase at age 30, a tripling at age 40 and a doubling at age 50. These developments 
mirror macroeconomic trends and institutional changes that affect income distributions in the long 
run. Therefore, the permanent variance and its growth follow a smoother trend than the transitory 
                                                          
31 These developments are not independent; e.g. skill-biased technological change is a likely driver of both job 
polarization (Dustmann et al., 2009) and deunionization (e. g. Acemoglu et al., 2001). 
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variance. In contrast to the transitory component, the increase in the permanent components starts 
after the second oil crisis in 1979 at ages 25, 30 and 40 and after the mid-1990s at age 50. Existing 
contracts seem to dampen immediate effects of large scale events on the permanent component, 
causing a slowed response. On the other hand, these events immediately hit the most vulnerable- 
young workers without a strong labor market attachment and job seekers. This causes immediate 
effects in insecurity for young workers after macro-shocks and delayed effects on permanent 
divergences at later ages.    
Studies on other countries report comparable results for men. For the U.S., Moffitt and Gottschalk 
(2012) report a substantial increase in earnings instability throughout the 1970s and 1980s and major 
more immediate shifts during recessions. They further identify a considerable rise in the permanent 
component since the mid-1990s. Although their data does not allow for controlling cohort differences, 
these results roughly align with ours. For Canada, Baker and Solon (2003) and Ostrovsky (2010) 
document a rise in both components after the second oil crises in 1980 and another steady increase 
since the early 1990s. For Italy, Cappellari (2004) finds similar trends with a stronger increasing 
permanent component. Apart from recessions, he ascribes the rise to higher demand for skilled labor 
and the decline of the strongly regulated pay-system in Italy. In this process wages become more often 
determined at the firm level, which can be compared to what happened in Germany. Further, Sologon 
and Van Kerm (2014) provide a visual summary of existing studies on European countries and the US, 
confirming the upward trends in both components (except for the transitory component in 





Figure 6: Empirical and predicted variance at selected ages 
 
Source: FDZ-RV − VSKT2002, 2004-2009_Bönke, own calculations. 
  
Figure 7: Vartiance growth rates at selected ages 



























































































5.4 Implications and discussion 
 
The presented findings relate to gross earnings and have immediate implications for net disposable 
income and consumption. The extent that an individual or society and its welfare is affected depends 
on the welfare state’s ability to insure against earnings risk and to compensate for permanent income 
differences through redistribution. Younger cohorts and lower skilled individuals experience higher 
transitory fluctuations of gross earnings and more pronounced inequality in terms of a more dispersed 
permanent income component. Without insurance or the adjustment of existing social security 
schemes, those transitory fluctuations translate directly into additional welfare costs (Storesletten et 
al., 2001; Blundell and Preston, 2008). So far the German welfare state seems to cope well in 
smoothing transitory earnings shocks, even for younger cohorts (Bartels and Bönke, 2013). Mitigating 
increasing long-term disparities, on the other hand, would require increasing redistributive 
capabilities, e.g. by more progressive income tax schedule. However, recent modifications to German 
income taxes show an opposite trend and it is unlikely that this trend will change.32  
As discussed above, many forces that drive rising permanent disparities are global in nature. However, 
developments in Germany tend to amplify this trend. The formerly strong equalizing influence of trade 
unions is diminishing, reflected declines in coverage of sectoral contracting agreements and union 
membership. Further, to strengthen international competitiveness, the adopted labor market 
deregulation aimed at cutting employment costs and increasing flexibility. In terms of employment 
and economic recovery, the deregulation is successful, however at the cost of higher inequality 
(Dustmann et al., 2014). This flexibility, along with decentralization of wage determination from the 
industry level to single firms or even workers, coincides with a decrease of real wages at the lower 
end of the wage distribution. In sum, the changing German labor market institutions further fostered 
the dispersion of wages and earnings careers. At the same time, adjustments in the tax and transfer 
system reduced the redistributive impact of the German welfare state (Bartels and Bönke, 2013). 
Hence, gross earnings inequality translates into net earnings and disposable income inequality.  
Although Germany’s economy is recently performing exceptionally well, it is unlikely that Germany 
will ever regulate the labor market in the way that it was in the 1960s, due to the fear of losing its 
competitive advantage. Increased flexibility might also attract more volatility industries and therefore 
amplify the trend of increasing earnings instability and inequality (Cunat and Melitz, 2012). Hence, 
                                                          
32 Figure C.2 displays the evolution of marginal and average income tax rates from 1958 through 2013 for 
varying earnings levels. Figure C.2 shows a reduction in progressivity of the German income tax since the mid-
1980s. For example, the marginal tax rate for employees earning 5 times the average decreases from about 
55% in 1985 to 42% in 2013 and the average tax rates falls from 47% to 37%. At the same time, the marginal 
tax rate for employees earning half the average income increases from 22% to 25% while their average tax rate 
falls from 16% to 10%.  
26 
 
employees starting their earnings career after the 2000s will likely experience a continuing trend in 
rising levels of inequality and uncertainty. Still, excesses at the lower end of the wage distribution are 
of concern and in 2015 Germany introduced a nationwide minimum wage. Its impact on earnings 
inequality and volatility remains to be investigated. On the one hand, it might increase the 
unemployment risk for low-skilled workers, but on the other hand, it might decrease the pressure on 
low wages (see e.g. Lee and Saez (2012) for a discussion). 
6 Conclusion 
We scrutinize the effects of historic and recent event which transformed the German labor market on 
earnings dynamics in Germany by decomposing earnings’ variances into a permanent and a transitory 
component. Using administrative data covering complete earnings life cycles of West German males 
born between 1935 and 1974, we can show how the profound changes of the German labor market 
affected inequality and stability over a period of 50 years. To model the evolution of earnings within 
individual life-cycles, we specify both a random walk and a random growth for the permanent and an 
AR(1)-process and a quartic age term for the transitory component. Next to these microeconomic 
dynamics, both components include period and cohort specific shifters to explicitly model 
macroeconomic dynamics and generational differences. In this regard the model leaves us with 
greater detail compared to approaches utilized in comparable studies. For the development of 
microeconomic dynamics across life cycles, we find an increasing permanent and about u-shaped 
transitory component. We also identify a trade-off between initially high earnings and subsequent 
earnings growth. While our results validate most of the findings from studies on shorter panels, we 
find that modeling extensive time frames requires explicit accounting for cohort specific differences.  
Although we identify common life-cycle features, our main results stem from comparing volatility 
across generations. Looking at the evolution at different stages of the life-cycle, we find an upward 
trend for both transitory and permanent component. This finding is also commonly identified in 
studies on other countries despite differences regarding institutions, periods investigated, data used 
or methodology applied. The results mirror how some global long-term trends like declining 
manufacturing sectors, deunionization, increasing international economic integration and job 
polarization affect many Western societies. Still, first the unique situation following World War II and 
second the reunification with its both its financial obligations and the massive inflow of migrants make 
Germany a special case. The order of magnitude and explanatory power of the two components differs 
substantially across countries and time. For Germany, we find a strongly increasing transitory 
component at young ages with a trend starting in the early 1970s and intensification in the mid-1990s. 
For older workers, we find moderate increases. The permanent component starts increasing in the 
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early 1980s and strongly increases in the early 2000s for all ages. Our results suggest that structural 
labor market changes affect both components and immediately translate into increasing short-term 
earnings risks especially for young workers. With delay, these structural changes also translate into 
increasing permanent divergences, especially at later ages.  
The described trends of earnings dynamics are likely to continue and have several implications. 
Earnings risks upon labor market entry will remain high and it will become increasingly difficult to 
obtain stable employment. At later stages of the life cycle after labor market entry, permanent 
divergences will become more important. This implies increasing lifetime earnings inequality. Thus, 
although the flexibility gained through deregulation is deemed an important source of Germany’s 
recent economic success, the downsides are rising insecurity and inequality. This burden, however, is 
carried mainly by the younger generations. 
In general, short-term earnings risks are rather successfully mitigated by welfare state insurance 
(Bartels and Bönke, 2013). Mitigating increasing long-term disparities on the contrary would require 
increasing redistributive capabilities, which is currently unlikely. Therefore, permanent disparities are 
likely to gain even more importance in the future, reflecting in a continuing trend of rising lifetime 
earnings inequality. By the nature of our study, the most recent developments cannot be captured. 
The most interesting event is probably the introduction of the German minimum wage in 2015, which 




Appendix A: Data 
Bönke, Corneo and Lüthen (2015) provide further information on sample selection, dataset and 
indicators of the social security system; see also their online Appendix. 
Table A.1: Sample descriptives 




year Last age Years Moments VSKT  
Cohort observations years     observed included   wave 
1935 1005 33745 1960 1994 59 35 630 2002 
1936 962 32168 1961 1995 59 35 630 2002 
1937 993 33094 1962 1996 59 35 630 2004 
1938 1026 34235 1963 1997 59 35 630 2005 
1939 1054 34979 1964 1998 59 35 630 2006 
1940 1025 33382 1965 1999 59 35 630 2007 
1941 1072 34889 1966 2000 59 35 630 2008 
1942 1035 33822 1967 2001 59 35 630 2009 
1943 1029 33639 1968 2002 59 35 630 2009 
1944 987 32267 1969 2003 59 35 630 2009 
1945 1091 35327 1970 2004 59 35 630 2009 
1946 1063 34377 1971 2005 59 35 630 2009 
1947 1058 34124 1972 2006 59 35 630 2009 
1948 1066 33971 1973 2007 59 35 630 2009 
1949 1027 32483 1974 2008 59 35 630 2009 
1950 1069 34434 1975 2009 59 35 630 2009 
1951 1096 34083 1976 2009 58 34 595 2009 
1952 1097 33218 1977 2009 57 33 561 2009 
1953 1118 32942 1978 2009 56 32 528 2009 
1954 1150 32930 1979 2009 55 31 496 2009 
1955 1178 32803 1980 2009 54 30 465 2009 
1956 1232 33209 1981 2009 53 29 435 2009 
1957 1231 31854 1982 2009 52 28 406 2009 
1958 1258 31696 1983 2009 51 27 378 2009 
1959 1290 31012 1984 2009 50 26 351 2009 
1960 1315 30498 1985 2009 49 25 325 2009 
1961 1379 30855 1986 2009 48 24 300 2009 
1962 1432 30706 1987 2009 47 23 276 2009 
1963 1443 29352 1988 2009 46 22 253 2009 
1964 1426 27798 1989 2009 45 21 231 2009 
1965 1480 27487 1990 2009 44 20 210 2009 
1966 1505 26387 1991 2009 43 19 190 2009 
1967 1519 25195 1992 2009 42 18 171 2009 
1968 1554 24304 1993 2009 41 17 153 2009 
1969 1635 23791 1994 2009 40 16 136 2009 
1970 1619 22138 1995 2009 39 15 120 2009 
1971 1470 18764 1996 2009 38 14 105 2009 
1972 1464 17354 1997 2009 37 13 91 2009 
1973 1510 16576 1998 2009 36 12 78 2009 
1974 1469 14797 1999 2009 35 11 66 2009 
Total 49,432 1,200,685         17000   





Appendix B: Model estimation and robustness 
(1) Estimation 
After de-meaning the earnings, cohort specific variances and covariances are calculated and then 
stacked upon each other. This provides the vector of sample moments,𝐶𝐶 = 𝑓𝑓(𝜃𝜃). Then, we employ 
GMM to minimize the distance between this vector and the theoretical vector provided by the model 
parameters: 
(B.1) 𝑄𝑄 = [𝐶𝐶 − 𝑓𝑓�𝜃𝜃��]′𝑊𝑊[𝐶𝐶 − 𝑓𝑓�𝜃𝜃��]   
As shown by Altonji and Segal (1996) and Clark (1996), the asymptotically optimal weighting matrix 
induces a bias in finite sample. Therefore, following e. g. Haider (2001) and Altonji and Segal (1996), 
we use the identity matrix as weighting matrix 𝑊𝑊. The estimation, often called equally weighted 
minimum distance, effectively becomes a nonlinear least squares estimation (Chamberlain, 1984). 
Standard errors are derived using the delta-method employing the fourth moments matrix. Standard 
errors are calculated with the delta-method, 𝑉𝑉(𝜃𝜃) = (𝐺𝐺′𝐺𝐺)−1𝐺𝐺′𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺(𝐺𝐺′𝐺𝐺)−1, with 𝑉𝑉 being the fourth 
moment matrix and 𝐺𝐺 the gradient matrix derived from the estimation (e. g. Cappellari, 2004). Our 
dataset provides 17,000 sample moments used in the estimation procedure.  
(2) Robustness 
At first, we give a brief overview about the models shown in this section. Although the estimation of 
some parameters varies, our results of a shift in the variance components as well as our other results 
are qualitatively alike. Figures for all scenarios can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
Model 1: This is the baseline model. See Section 3 in the main text for description. 
Model 2: Here we estimate the baseline model on a different sample selection. We follow Bingley et 
al. (2013) and condition on 5 years of consecutive earnings. 
Model 3: This model deviates from our baseline model in equation (7). We follow Baker and Solon 
(2003) and, instead of including cohort shifters for the transitory component, we estimate cohort 
specific initial variances 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖0~�0;𝜎𝜎0,𝑐𝑐2 �. Equation (7) now becomes: 
(B.2) 𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑇𝑇 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑇𝑇 � = 𝜌𝜌2𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐−1�+ 𝜏𝜏𝑐𝑐2�𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,02 + (𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐)𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,12 + (𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐)2𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,22 + (𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐)3𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,32+ (𝑡𝑡 − 𝑐𝑐)4𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,42 � 
 
  
Model 4: Because the oldest cohorts are included over their entire life cycle, we might face a bias in 
our estimation results due to their “overrepresentation.”  Therefore, we start estimating our model in 
1979 instead of starting in the estimation in 1960. This leads to a decreased weight of the older cohorts 
in the model estimation. Still, we estimate similar shock persistence 𝜌𝜌. A comparison of the permanent 
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and the transitory component does not show qualitative differences. Still, the core model parameter 
estimates are expected to differ because the cohort shifters are normalized to 1979 and not to 1960, 
as in the baseline model. Since our observation period is left-censored, the estimation of the initial 
transitory variance 𝜎𝜎02 might be biased. Therefore, we follow Moffitt and Gottschalk (2012) and 
estimate an additional parameter 𝛼𝛼 for all left-censored cohorts. For left-censored cohorts, 𝜎𝜎02 is now 
included as follows: (1 + 𝛼𝛼 ∙ 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒79)𝜎𝜎02. At this, 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒79 is the distance of the cohorts’ age in 1979 and 
age 25. By way of an example, this bias-correction obtains 19 for cohort 1935 in the year 1979 and 
yields a transitory variance of 𝑉𝑉𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖1935,1970𝑇𝑇 � = (1 + 19𝛼𝛼)𝜎𝜎02. 
 
Table B.1: Core model estimates 
 Coefficient Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇2 0.051 0.022 0.084 0.026 0.050 0.022 0.016 0.001 
𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 2.65E-04 1.18E-04 9.02E-05 3.86E-05 2.70E-04 1.22E-04 8.32E-05 9.34E-06 
𝜎𝜎𝛾𝛾2 0.0101 0.0043 0.0154 0.0048 0.0097 0.0042 0.0033 0.0003 
𝜎𝜎𝜇𝜇𝛾𝛾2  -3.28E-04 1.75E-04 -9.83E-04 3.23E-04 -3.17E-04 1.72E-04 -1.76E-04 3.79E-05 
𝜎𝜎0
2 0.100 0.057 0.123 0.067    0.089 0.015 
𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,02  0.095 0.055 0.114 0.062 0.090 0.004 0.090 0.015 
𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,12  -0.018 0.010 -0.013 0.007 -0.016 0.001 -0.018 0.003 
𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,22  1.73E-03 9.97E-04 1.59E-03 8.88E-04 1.27E-03 5.78E-05 1.91E-03 2.82E-04 
𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,32  -7.27E-05 4.20E-05 -7.96E-05 4.52E-05 -4.33E-05 2.09E-06 -8.54E-05 1.23E-05 
𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖,42  1.17E-06 6.81E-07 1.60E-06 9.27E-07 5.54E-07 2.73E-08 1.44E-06 2.05E-07 
𝜌𝜌 0.278 0.005 0.258 0.005 0.277 0.005 0.269 0.005 
𝛼𝛼        -0.055 0.012 




Table B.2: Permanent cohort shifter  
 Model 1: Base 
Model 2: Adj. sample 
selection 
Model 3: Cohort inital 
variances 
Model 4: Shorted time 
frame 
Cohort Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
1935 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 
1936 1.03 0.03 1.04 0.04 1.04 0.03 1.03 0.05 
1937 1.04 0.03 1.04 0.04 1.04 0.03 1.03 0.04 
1938 1.06 0.03 1.04 0.04 1.05 0.03 1.05 0.04 
1939 1.16 0.04 1.10 0.04 1.15 0.03 1.17 0.05 
1940 1.15 0.04 1.14 0.04 1.14 0.04 1.14 0.05 
1941 1.20 0.04 1.17 0.04 1.19 0.04 1.18 0.05 
1942 1.28 0.04 1.20 0.04 1.27 0.04 1.27 0.05 
1943 1.34 0.04 1.26 0.04 1.33 0.04 1.33 0.05 
1944 1.27 0.04 1.20 0.04 1.25 0.04 1.25 0.05 
1945 1.31 0.04 1.23 0.04 1.30 0.04 1.30 0.05 
1946 1.27 0.04 1.24 0.04 1.26 0.04 1.26 0.05 
1947 1.41 0.04 1.29 0.04 1.40 0.04 1.40 0.06 
1948 1.44 0.05 1.34 0.04 1.43 0.05 1.43 0.06 
1949 1.56 0.05 1.43 0.04 1.56 0.05 1.55 0.06 
1950 1.52 0.05 1.42 0.04 1.51 0.05 1.51 0.06 
1951 1.65 0.05 1.49 0.04 1.65 0.05 1.64 0.07 
1952 1.63 0.05 1.47 0.05 1.62 0.05 1.62 0.06 
1953 1.70 0.05 1.56 0.05 1.70 0.05 1.69 0.06 
1954 1.74 0.06 1.58 0.05 1.74 0.05 1.73 0.07 
1955 1.75 0.06 1.52 0.05 1.76 0.06 1.74 0.07 
1956 1.78 0.06 1.66 0.05 1.77 0.06 1.77 0.07 
1957 2.00 0.07 1.77 0.06 1.98 0.07 1.99 0.08 
1958 2.00 0.06 1.77 0.06 1.99 0.06 1.99 0.08 
1959 2.13 0.06 1.87 0.06 2.13 0.06 2.12 0.08 
1960 2.14 0.07 1.89 0.06 2.13 0.07 2.13 0.09 
1961 2.13 0.07 1.85 0.06 2.12 0.07 2.11 0.08 
1962 2.30 0.07 1.94 0.06 2.28 0.07 2.29 0.09 
1963 2.46 0.08 2.08 0.07 2.46 0.08 2.45 0.10 
1964 2.49 0.08 2.06 0.07 2.47 0.08 2.47 0.10 
1965 2.51 0.08 2.06 0.07 2.48 0.08 2.49 0.10 
1966 2.61 0.08 2.12 0.07 2.59 0.08 2.59 0.11 
1967 2.54 0.08 2.07 0.07 2.54 0.08 2.53 0.11 
1968 2.78 0.09 2.21 0.08 2.77 0.09 2.76 0.12 
1969 2.80 0.09 2.26 0.08 2.77 0.09 2.78 0.12 
1970 2.88 0.10 2.23 0.08 2.88 0.10 2.87 0.13 
1971 3.00 0.11 2.32 0.09 3.03 0.11 2.98 0.14 
1972 3.20 0.12 2.44 0.09 3.21 0.12 3.18 0.15 
1973 3.26 0.12 2.43 0.09 3.27 0.12 3.25 0.15 
1974 3.27 0.13 2.44 0.10 3.37 0.13 3.26 0.16 




Table B.3: Transitory cohort shifter/Cohort specific transitory initial variances 
 Model 1: Base 
Model 2: Adj. sample 
selection 
Model 3: Cohort inital 
variances 
Model 4: Shorted time 
frame 
Cohort Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
1935 1 - 1 - 0.10 0.06 1 - 
1936 1.08 0.02 1.08 0.02 0.14 0.08 1.11 0.02 
1937 1.06 0.02 1.05 0.03 0.11 0.06 1.10 0.02 
1938 0.95 0.02 0.97 0.03 0.13 0.08 0.94 0.02 
1939 0.97 0.02 0.99 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.99 0.02 
1940 0.97 0.02 1.05 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.95 0.03 
1941 1.03 0.03 1.10 0.03 0.15 0.05 1.04 0.02 
1942 1.01 0.03 1.08 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.99 0.03 
1943 0.98 0.03 1.15 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.96 0.03 
1944 1.05 0.04 1.18 0.04 0.09 0.07 1.07 0.03 
1945 1.03 0.03 1.21 0.05 0.08 0.03 1.00 0.03 
1946 1.07 0.04 1.27 0.05 0.08 0.03 1.07 0.03 
1947 1.12 0.04 1.25 0.06 0.12 0.03 1.16 0.04 
1948 1.21 0.05 1.38 0.07 0.11 0.04 1.24 0.04 
1949 1.34 0.05 1.50 0.08 0.15 0.04 1.37 0.05 
1950 1.16 0.05 1.47 0.08 0.09 0.02 1.22 0.05 
1951 1.34 0.06 1.61 0.09 0.10 0.03 1.45 0.06 
1952 1.39 0.07 1.66 0.10 0.12 0.04 1.46 0.07 
1953 1.48 0.07 1.74 0.11 0.12 0.03 1.59 0.08 
1954 1.49 0.07 1.79 0.12 0.14 0.02 1.61 0.09 
1955 1.58 0.08 1.81 0.12 0.18 0.03 1.70 0.09 
1956 1.43 0.08 1.91 0.14 0.09 0.02 1.55 0.09 
1957 1.40 0.09 1.82 0.14 0.09 0.02 1.51 0.10 
1958 1.48 0.10 1.96 0.16 0.11 0.01 1.62 0.11 
1959 1.58 0.10 2.04 0.17 0.09 0.02 1.74 0.12 
1960 1.58 0.10 2.08 0.17 0.09 0.01 1.75 0.12 
1961 1.62 0.10 2.21 0.19 0.08 0.02 1.80 0.12 
1962 1.49 0.11 2.13 0.20 0.10 0.01 1.66 0.12 
1963 1.69 0.12 2.31 0.22 0.11 0.01 1.90 0.14 
1964 1.55 0.11 2.29 0.22 0.07 0.01 1.75 0.13 
1965 1.57 0.12 2.37 0.23 0.10 0.02 1.78 0.14 
1966 1.69 0.12 2.40 0.24 0.12 0.02 1.92 0.15 
1967 1.80 0.13 2.50 0.26 0.13 0.02 2.07 0.16 
1968 1.82 0.13 2.51 0.27 0.09 0.01 2.09 0.16 
1969 1.78 0.13 2.66 0.29 0.08 0.01 2.06 0.16 
1970 1.93 0.14 2.83 0.32 0.09 0.01 2.24 0.17 
1971 2.10 0.16 2.96 0.34 0.11 0.01 2.44 0.19 
1972 2.06 0.16 3.11 0.37 0.10 0.01 2.40 0.20 
1973 2.15 0.17 3.27 0.40 0.12 0.01 2.51 0.21 
1974 2.44 0.20 3.54 0.44 0.15 0.01 2.86 0.24 





Table B.4: Permanent period shifter 
 Model 1: Base 
Model 2: Adj. sample 
selection 
Model 3: Cohort inital 
variances 
Model 4: Shorted time 
frame 
Period Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
1960 1  1  1    
1961 0.84 0.13 0.81 0.09 0.84 0.14   
1962 0.77 0.13 0.82 0.11 0.77 0.14   
1963 0.86 0.15 0.83 0.11 0.87 0.16   
1964 0.72 0.13 0.73 0.10 0.72 0.13   
1965 0.63 0.12 0.68 0.09 0.65 0.12   
1966 0.65 0.12 0.69 0.09 0.66 0.13   
1967 0.77 0.15 0.77 0.11 0.79 0.16   
1968 0.75 0.14 0.77 0.10 0.77 0.15   
1969 0.72 0.14 0.70 0.09 0.73 0.14   
1970 0.65 0.13 0.65 0.09 0.66 0.13   
1971 0.62 0.12 0.64 0.09 0.63 0.13   
1972 0.61 0.12 0.61 0.08 0.62 0.12   
1973 0.58 0.11 0.64 0.09 0.59 0.12   
1974 0.59 0.12 0.64 0.09 0.60 0.12   
1975 0.63 0.12 0.68 0.10 0.64 0.13   
1976 0.61 0.12 0.66 0.09 0.62 0.13   
1977 0.60 0.12 0.65 0.09 0.61 0.12   
1978 0.58 0.12 0.63 0.09 0.59 0.12   
1979 0.55 0.11 0.61 0.08 0.55 0.11 1  
1980 0.52 0.10 0.58 0.08 0.53 0.11 0.95 0.01 
1981 0.53 0.11 0.59 0.08 0.54 0.11 0.96 0.01 
1982 0.55 0.11 0.60 0.08 0.55 0.11 0.99 0.01 
1983 0.55 0.11 0.60 0.08 0.56 0.11 1.00 0.01 
1984 0.60 0.12 0.63 0.09 0.61 0.12 1.09 0.01 
1985 0.60 0.12 0.64 0.09 0.60 0.12 1.08 0.01 
1986 0.59 0.12 0.63 0.09 0.60 0.12 1.07 0.01 
1987 0.57 0.11 0.62 0.09 0.58 0.12 1.03 0.01 
1988 0.55 0.11 0.61 0.09 0.56 0.11 1.00 0.01 
1989 0.54 0.11 0.60 0.08 0.55 0.11 0.97 0.01 
1990 0.52 0.10 0.58 0.08 0.53 0.11 0.94 0.01 
1991 0.51 0.10 0.57 0.08 0.52 0.11 0.91 0.01 
1992 0.49 0.10 0.55 0.08 0.50 0.10 0.89 0.01 
1993 0.49 0.10 0.55 0.08 0.50 0.10 0.89 0.01 
1994 0.48 0.10 0.54 0.08 0.49 0.10 0.86 0.01 
1995 0.48 0.10 0.54 0.08 0.48 0.10 0.86 0.01 
1996 0.46 0.09 0.53 0.08 0.47 0.10 0.84 0.01 
1997 0.46 0.09 0.53 0.08 0.46 0.09 0.82 0.01 
1998 0.45 0.09 0.54 0.08 0.46 0.09 0.82 0.02 
1999 0.44 0.09 0.52 0.07 0.44 0.09 0.79 0.01 
2000 0.43 0.09 0.52 0.07 0.44 0.09 0.78 0.02 
2001 0.43 0.09 0.51 0.07 0.43 0.09 0.77 0.02 
2002 0.42 0.09 0.51 0.07 0.43 0.09 0.76 0.02 
2003 0.42 0.08 0.51 0.07 0.43 0.09 0.76 0.02 
2004 0.41 0.08 0.51 0.07 0.42 0.09 0.75 0.02 
2005 0.42 0.08 0.54 0.08 0.43 0.09 0.76 0.02 
2006 0.42 0.08 0.53 0.08 0.42 0.09 0.76 0.02 
2007 0.43 0.09 0.54 0.08 0.43 0.09 0.77 0.02 
2008 0.42 0.09 0.54 0.08 0.42 0.09 0.76 0.02 
2009 0.42 0.08 0.54 0.08 0.42 0.09 0.76 0.02 





Table B.5: Transitory period shifter 
 Model 1: Base 
Model 2: Adj. sample 
selection 
Model 3: Cohort inital 
variances 
Model 4: Shorted time 
frame 
Period Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
1960 1  1  1    
1961 0.93 0.32 1.03 0.30 0.89 0.12   
1962 0.98 0.31 0.96 0.28 1.03 0.09   
1963 0.86 0.28 0.91 0.26 0.84 0.10   
1964 0.94 0.28 1.00 0.28 1.08 0.06   
1965 1.10 0.32 1.04 0.29 0.99 0.09   
1966 1.11 0.33 1.04 0.28 1.05 0.06   
1967 1.06 0.31 1.08 0.30 1.04 0.07   
1968 1.00 0.29 0.93 0.26 0.98 0.06   
1969 1.01 0.32 0.93 0.26 1.08 0.06   
1970 1.01 0.30 0.92 0.26 1.12 0.06   
1971 1.07 0.32 0.99 0.27 1.22 0.05   
1972 1.13 0.33 0.95 0.26 1.21 0.07   
1973 1.11 0.33 0.99 0.27 1.29 0.06   
1974 1.21 0.35 1.02 0.28 1.38 0.06   
1975 1.17 0.34 0.99 0.27 1.47 0.06   
1976 1.15 0.33 0.96 0.27 1.46 0.05   
1977 1.23 0.36 1.03 0.29 1.61 0.06   
1978 1.13 0.33 0.88 0.25 1.52 0.06   
1979 1.11 0.32 0.88 0.25 1.49 0.06 1  
1980 1.05 0.31 0.87 0.24 1.38 0.05 1.02 0.07 
1981 1.10 0.32 0.85 0.24 1.67 0.05 1.07 0.07 
1982 1.10 0.32 0.88 0.25 1.66 0.06 1.06 0.07 
1983 1.31 0.38 0.92 0.26 1.93 0.05 1.25 0.09 
1984 1.09 0.32 0.82 0.23 1.73 0.05 1.04 0.07 
1985 1.10 0.32 0.83 0.23 1.76 0.05 1.04 0.07 
1986 1.06 0.31 0.78 0.22 1.78 0.05 1.00 0.07 
1987 1.09 0.32 0.73 0.21 1.73 0.04 1.02 0.07 
1988 1.09 0.32 0.75 0.21 1.76 0.04 1.02 0.07 
1989 1.07 0.31 0.71 0.20 1.85 0.05 0.99 0.07 
1990 1.01 0.30 0.67 0.19 1.68 0.04 0.93 0.07 
1991 1.00 0.29 0.67 0.20 1.64 0.04 0.92 0.07 
1992 0.94 0.28 0.63 0.18 1.57 0.04 0.86 0.06 
1993 0.98 0.29 0.63 0.18 1.80 0.04 0.89 0.07 
1994 1.08 0.32 0.68 0.20 2.03 0.04 0.98 0.07 
1995 0.99 0.29 0.64 0.19 1.91 0.04 0.90 0.07 
1996 1.14 0.34 0.72 0.21 2.20 0.04 1.03 0.08 
1997 1.15 0.34 0.72 0.21 2.30 0.05 1.04 0.08 
1998 1.08 0.32 0.68 0.20 2.18 0.04 0.97 0.08 
1999 1.10 0.33 0.68 0.20 2.24 0.05 0.98 0.08 
2000 1.00 0.30 0.61 0.18 2.19 0.05 0.89 0.07 
2001 0.97 0.29 0.59 0.18 2.14 0.04 0.87 0.07 
2002 0.97 0.29 0.57 0.17 2.16 0.04 0.86 0.07 
2003 0.97 0.29 0.59 0.18 2.21 0.05 0.86 0.07 
2004 0.99 0.30 0.55 0.17 2.29 0.05 0.87 0.07 
2005 0.94 0.28 0.56 0.17 2.29 0.05 0.82 0.07 
2006 0.93 0.28 0.52 0.16 2.34 0.05 0.80 0.07 
2007 0.88 0.27 0.51 0.16 2.31 0.05 0.76 0.07 
2008 0.80 0.24 0.46 0.14 2.17 0.05 0.68 0.06 
2009 0.91 0.28 0.49 0.15 2.45 0.00 0.76 0.07 




Appendix C: Supplements 
Table C.1: Changes in labor market regulations since 1972 
Year  Law (German Abbreviation) Summary of Content 
1972 AÜG Permission of subcontracted work for up to 3 month 
1985 BeschFG  1. Reduction of dismissal protection and weakening of standard employment contracts  
  2. Introduction of fixed term contracts for first time employees (up to 18 month) 
  3. Extension of maximum time for subcontracted work from 3 to 6 month 
1990 BeschFG  Relaxation of justification requirements for fixed term contracts 
1993 KündFG Harmonization of employment protection (abolishment of special arrangements) 
 1. SKWGP Extension of maximum time for subcontracted work from 6 to 9 month 
1996 BeschFG  1. Fixed term contracts can be applied multiple times 
  2. Fixed term contracts enhanced to 24 month 
  
3. Further reduction of employment protection through the 
introduction of severance pay rules and for employees in small 
businesses 
1997 ARFG Extension of maximum time for subcontracted work from 9 to 12 month 
1998 Gesetz zur Sicherung der Arbeitnehmerrechte 
Rollback of employment protection legislation to the regulations in 
place prior to BeschFG 1996 
2002 Job-AQTIV_Gesetz Extension of maximum time for subcontracted work from 12 to 24 month 
2003 Hartz 1 Abolishment of time limit for subcontracted work 
  Reintroduction of employment protection legislation according to BeschFG 1996 
Source: Bundesgesetzblätter, various issues (available on request).  
Note: Year is the year of parliamentary decision on passing the law, the entry of the law into force can deviate. For a more 





Figure C.1: Share of job changers by age and cohort 
 
Source: Bartels et al. (2015) 
 
 
Figure C.2: Average and marginal tax rates, 1958 - 2013 
 
Note: Mean earnings according to average earnings published in Appendices 1 and 2 of Social Code VI (Sozialgesetzbuch VI), 
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